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RECENT DECISIONS
THE ESTATE OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY IS NOT A RECOGNIZED MODE OF
OWNERSHIP IN MONTANA.-A husband and his wife were conveyed real
property "as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common." Subsequenty, they were divorced. Two years
after the divorce, the husband died. He was survived by his wife and
various brothers and sisters. The latter, the appellants, brought the
action to quiet title, contending that the deed created a tenancy by the
entirety and that when the grantees were divorced, the tenancy was,
by operation of law, converted into a tenancy in common. The trial
court held that a joint tenancy was created and that the wife took by
right of survivorship. On appeal, held, affirmed. The Montana Supreme
Court stated that the tenancy by the entirety is not recognized in Mon-
tana. Thus, the deed could create but one type of estate, a joint tenancy.
Clark v. Clark, 387 P.2d 907 (Mont. 1963).
Beginning in the 14th or 15th century in England, two or more per-
sons were able to own concurrent interests in the same estate in land.
Three types of these interests form the basis for the modern law of co-
ownership of real property.
Tenancy in Common. In this co-ownership, there is but one
unity, that of possession. The right to possession of the whole
of the estate belongs to all of the cotenants, yet, each cotenant
has a separate and distinct interest in the property. The interest
of one tenant may either be unequal to that of the others,
acquired at a different time and by a different instrument, or
conveyed by one tenant without the consent of the others. Un-
like the other two concurrent interests to be considered, the right
of survivorship is not an incident to a tenancy in common. On
the death of one of the cotenants his interest passes to his
heirs.'
Joint Tenancy. The creation of a joint tenancy requires four
unities, that of time, title, interest and possession. There must
be but one interest created by one instrument. The interest of all
of the cotenants must commence at the same time and be held
under one possession. If one of the four unities is lacking, the re-
sult is a tenancy in common. Thus, joint tenants are seized of a
share and also of the whole. The right of survivorship is the most
important aspect of the joint tenancy. When one of the tenants
dies, the entire estate remains in the survivors. Neither the
widow or heirs of the deceased tenant nor his creditors have any
claim against the enlarged interest of the surviving tenants.
One joint tenant, without the consent of the other tenants, may
alienate his interest. This transfer severs the interest conveyed
from the joint tenancy. The transferee holds as a tenant in
common with the remaining joint tenants.2
'MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO REAL PROPERTY 224-225 (1962); 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
2MOYNIHAN, supra at 216-223; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra §§ 6.1 - 6.4.
Under the common law theory of the "title mortgage" where title to the property
is transferred to the mortgagee, the execution of the mortgage severs the joint
tenancy. A conflict has risen as to the effect of a 'lien mortgage" executed upon
a joint estate. California has taken the position that the. execution of a "lien mort-
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Tenancy by the Entirety. The common law developed a type
of cotenancy peculiar to the marital relationship. This was the
estate of a tenancy by the entirety. In addition to the four
unities requisite to the joint tenancy, the unity of husband and
wife was necessary to the creation of the estate. The common law
considered the husband and wife as but one person for legal
purposes. Thus, while the marital state existed, both and each
were seized of the whole of any transfer of real property made
to them as man and wife. The husband was given complete
control of the use, rents, profits and possession of the property.
These rights were subject to execution and seizure by his
creditors and could be voluntarily conveyed by him without his
wife's consent. The ability of the husband to convey the in-
terests in the estate during the joint lives of the spouses arose
from his position under the common law as guardian of the wife
and was not an incident of the estate. Thus, the husband could
not voluntarily or involuntarily destroy his wife's right of sur-
vivorship.3
The tenancy in common, and, for all purposes with which this article
is concerned, the joint tenancy, exist.today unchanged from their com-
mon law form. 4 The position of the tenancy by the entirety in modern
law is confused. Three states will be considered: New Jersey, because of
its modification of the estate; Wyoming, because of its recognition of it;
and Montana, because of its refusal to recognize the estate. The first
concern will be a discussion of the purpose of the Married Women's Act
in each state, and second, the effect of the Act upon the estate by the
entireties.
gage" on the property does not destroy or sever the joint tenancy. The California
court stated that there was no transfer of title, nor was the mortgagee entitled to
possession. The mortgage attached only to the mortgagor 's interest and when he
died the mortgage terminated. People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d
858 (1958). This position of the California court is not technically correct. The
execution of the "lien mortgage" would destroy the unity of interest of the joint
tenants, creating an interest in the mortgagee and thus sever the tenancy. See 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra § 6.2.
Under the traditional common law, a conveyance to two or more persons pre-
sumably created a joint tenancy. Generally this is not true today. Courts and
statutes now require an express intention to create rather than not to create. MOYNI-
HAN, supra at 218. Montana has a statute requiring an express intention to create
a joint interest. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 67-313. (Hereinafter REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.) However, the Montana Supreme Court has
stated that the words "joint tenants" are sufficient to establish the requisite in-
tention. Hennigh v. Hennigh, 131 Mont. 372, 309 P.2d 1022 (1957).
12 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1 § 6.6; MOYNIHAN, supra note 1 at 229-
335. Professor Moynihan states that "'. . . tenants by the entirety were seized of
the whole and not of a share .. . .As in the case of a joint tenancy, the incident of
survivorship attached to a tenancy by the entirety but it was an indestructible right
of survivorship. Both spouses could join in a conveyance of the property to a third
person but neither alone could create a severance of the tenancy or by any act defeat
the right of survivorship of the other spouse. No right of partition existed." MOYNI-
HAN, INTRODUCTION TO REAL PROPERTY, supra at 229-230.
'MOYNIHAN, supra at 216-223; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra §§ 6.1-6.4.
For Montana's position see Hennigh v. Hennigh, supra note 2. Modern courts tend
to look with disfavor on the estate of joint tenancy. At present, fifteen states
have either abolished or modified the estate and the right of survivorship as an inci-
dent to it. See Witzel v. Witzel, 368 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963).
2
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During the middle of the nineteenth century, the concepts of female
emancipation began to destroy the feudal idea of the unity of husband
and wife. As a result Married Women's Acts were enacted, the general
purpose of which was to place the wife on a plane of equality with her
husband in property matters. The husband's right to the control of the
use, rents, profits and possession of the property of the wife was taken
away. The wife was given independent control of her property with the
right to contract and to sue or be sued without the consent of her hus-
band.5 However, in elevating the wife to a position of equality with the
husband, the Acts did not purport to deprive the wife of the interests
which she held under the common law. Thus, in comparison of the above
states, a distinction must be made between the right given to the husband
under the common law by reason of his position as guardian of the wife,
and the incidents of the tenancy by the entirety which arose out of the
unity concept.6
In New Jersey the application of the Married Women's Act7 to the
estate by the entireties has produced the unique property interest of a,
tenancy in common with the right of survivorship.8 The New Jersey
court in King v. Green, held that the purpose of the New Jersey Married
Women's Act was not only to put the wife on a plane of equality with the
husband but to endow her with the capacity to hold property interests
separately and independently. The court also stated that there was
nothing in their statutes indicating a legislative intent to wholly prohibit
the estate. By an analysis of the Married Women's Act and prior New
Jersey cases, the court felt compelled to create the new type of co-
5Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); King v. Green, 30 N.J. 395,
153 A.2d 49 (1959).
6MOYNIHAN, supra note 1 at 230. The rights of the spouses were not equal during
coverture. "The husband alone was entitled to possession, use and enjoyment of
the property. This superior right of the husband, however, would seem not to be
a peculiar attribute of the tenancy by the entirety but rather a consequence of the
husband's position as guardian of his wife." Massachusetts takes the position that
in a tenancy by the entirety, the husband has a life estate for the joint lives of the
spouses and a remainder in fee should he survive the wife. Quinlan v. Weeks, 332
Mass. 482, 126 N.E.2d 98 (1955). This position seems to be in conflict with the
general rule. "The right of survivorship was an attribute of the ownership by
each spouse of the entire estate from the time it was conveyed to them; it was not
a contingent future interest in the surviving spouse, superadded to a joint life estate."
MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO REAL PROPERTY, supra at 230. See also 2 ASIERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra § 6.6, which states that the husband's right to the use,
possession, rents and profits of the estate could be reached by his creditors or con-
veyed by him, but that the tenants did not have individual interests that they could
convey and thus defeat the right of survivorship.
'N.J. STAT. ANN. 37:2-12 (1937). "The real and personal property of a woman
which she owns at the time of her marriage, and the real and personal property,
and the rents, issues and profits thereof, of a married woman, which she receives
or obtains in any manner whatever after her marriage, shall be her separate property
as if she were a femme sole." Cf., R.C.M. 1947, § 36-111. "All the property of the
wife owned before her marriage and that acquired afterwards is her separate prop-
erty. The wife, may, without consent, agreement and signature of her husband, con-
vey and transfer her separate property, real or personal, including the fee simple
title to real property or execute a power of attorney for the conveyance and transfer
thereof." See also Conley v. Conley, supra note 5, where the Montana Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of the Married Woman's Act was to free the wife
from the common law inequalities and to place her upon a plane of equality with
her husband in the enjoyment, control and possession of property.
8King v. Green, supra note 5.
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ownership.9 The right of survivorship is retained as it existed at the
common law. It is conveyable by either spouse but neither can defeat
the interest of the other. Thus, a conveyance by the husband of his
interests, or the attachment thereof by his creditors, creates in the trans-
feree a life estate with the possibility of a fee simple. Should the husband
predecease the wife, she is entitled to the whole of the estate including
any interests which the husband had conveyed. 10
To accept the New Jersey position it is necessary to assume that the
estate by the entireties as it existed at the common law gave to the hus-
band the right to the use, control, profits and rents of the estate. How-
ever, this right of the husbands was not an incident of the estate, but was
an incident of his position as the guardian of his wife. Under the com-
mon law, the tenancy by the entirety created in the spouses an indivisible
interest in the entirety of the estate, which indivisibility was defeated by
the husband's guardianship. It was this incident of the marital rela-
tionship which the Married Women's Acts were enacted to correct. They
were not enacted to deprive the wife of her use and enjoyment in the
whole."
Wyoming, on the other hand, has kept the estate of tenancy by the
entirety.12 The Wyoming court has stated that the purpose of its Married
Women's Act 13 was to sweep away the wife's disabilities as they had
existed at the common law. However, the act did not purport to destroy
the right of the spouses to the use and enjoyment of the whole of the
estate during their joint lives. To place the wife on a plane of equality
with her husband and yet hold that she could be deprived of the use and
enjoyment of one-half of the estate would be an "empty privilege. ' '14
'[F] or if the wife has the right to use and enjoy the whole, and
that right is protected by statutes which allow her complete
9King v. Green, supra note 5. The New Jersey court found itself bound by prior
decisions which had allowed the husband to convey his interest during the joint
lives of the spouses. By adding the conclusion that the right of survivorship of the
individual spouse was conveyable and that the estate by the entireties was not
abolished by the legislature the court was forced to create the tenancy in common
with the right of survivorship.
"King v. Green, supra note 5.
"Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 72 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213 (1956).
12Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, supra note 11.
"WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-22 (1957): "All the property, both real and personal, be-
longing to any married woman as her sole and separate property, or which
any woman hereafter married owns at the time of her marriage, or which
any married woman during coverture acquires in good faith from any person
whomsoever, or by descent or otherwise, together with all rents, issues, in-
crease and profits thereof, shall, notwithstanding her marriage, be and
remain during coverture her sole and separate property under her sole control
and be held, owned, possessed and enjoyed by her the same as though she
were sole and unmarried, and shall not be subject to the disposal, control
or interference of her husband, and shall be exempt from execution or at-
tachment for the debts of her husband; provided, that the same shall not
have been conveyed to her by her husband in fraud of his creditors; and that
the necessary expenses of the family and the education of the children are
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them,
and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately; provided,
further, that the personal expenses of the husband be not chargeable to the
wife's separate estate.'' Cf., New Jersey and Montana statutes, supra note 7.
"4Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, supra note 11.
[Vol. 25,
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freedom in the use, possession, and ownership of her property,
the wife and the wife alone should have the power to say
whether she will exchange the right of enjoying and using the
whole property jointly with her husband, or a part of the prop-
erty exclusively." 5
Under the Wyoming position, the right of survivorship is indivisible
and indestructable. Neither party can convey any interest in the estate
without the consent of the other spouse and the interests of the individual
spouses are not subject to attachment by their creditors. Thus, Wyoming
has elevated the wife to a position of equality and yet has retained the
estate by the entireties.
In the instant case, the Montana Supreme Court held that the ten-
ancy by the entirety was repugnant to and inconsistent with the laws
of the State.'6 The court based its determination upon the premise that
the Married Women's Act destroyed the fiction upon which the estate
was founded, the unity of husband and wife. The basis for the estate
having been destroyed, the court said, there can be no place for the
tenancy by the entirety in the law of Montana. It is important to note
that in reaching this conclusion, the court refused to inquire into various
policy considerations to determine whether the estate was otherwise
desirable.1 7 Because of this refusal, the court has left unanswered ques-
tions as to the effectiveness of an attempted conveyance of an estate by
the entireties, and has failed to recognize the real purpose behind the
Married Women's Act.' 8
"
5 Ward Terry 4. Co. v. Hensen, supra note 11 at 218.
"A limited Married Women's Act was enacted in Montana in 1865. Bannack Statutes,
§ 1, p. 369 (1865); Allen v. Rousil, 15 Mont. 446, 39 Pac. 459 (1895). Since that
time the Act has been broadened and the wife now maintains a complete separate
legal identity from the husband. The Bannack enactment is still in effect, except
that the right of curtesy in the husband no longer exists. See IR.C.M. 1947, §§
36-118, 36-131. Today the wife may contract or sue without the consent of her
husband. (IR.C.M. 1947, §§ 36-105, 36-110, 36-130); she may hold property as a
tenant in common or as a joint tenant. (R.C.M. 1947, § 36-108). Except for the
necessities of the family, the wife is not liable for the debts of her husband. (1.C.M.
1947, §§ 36-109, 36-114). The property which she had prior to her marriage, or ac-
quired by her subsequent thereto, is her separate property. (R.C.M. 1947, § 36-111).
See also Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Mont. 593, 208 P.2d 514 (1949); In re Maharray's
Estate, 79 Mont. 10, 254 Pac. 875 (1927). Although the tenancy in common has
always been a legally recognized means of co-ownership in Montana, the joint tenancy
has not. Ilennigh v. Hennigh, 131 Mont. 372, 309 P.2d 1022 (1957). For a discussion
of the Hennigh case, see 19 MONT. L. REV. 69 (1957). Since 1885, however, only
the tenancy by the entirety has been open to question although various decisions in
the past indicated that the estate was not prohibited. Hennigh v. Hennigh, supra;
In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 239, 234 P.2d 459 (1951). See MOYNIHAN, supra
note 1 at 231 n.1, where Montana is cited as recognizing the estate. The Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947, do not expressly recognize the estate, but they do not
expressly prohibit it either. The Revised Codes do state that the common law shall
be the law in Montana unless it is repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution or laws of Montana. (R.C.M. 1947, § 12-103). In the
instant case, the Montana Supreme Court held that the tenancy by the entirety was
inconsistent with the laws of Montana.
"Instant case at 911.
sThe problem before the Montana court was: what type of estate did the language
''as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenant in common"
create? In the Hennigh case, supra note 16, the Montana court stated that such
language created a joint tenancy. In the instant case, however, the court refused
to construe the language. Instead, it reviewed the various statutes and reasoned;
the basis for the tenancy by the entirety having been destroyed, and it therefore
not being a recognizable form of ownership in Montana, the only type of estate that 5
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The jurisdictions which refuse to recognize the estate by the en-
tireties or which in some way have modified it, as did New Jersey, have
set forth three arguments. First, the common law inability of the wife to
hold property no longer exists. The wife has been placed on a plane of
equality with her husband and is entitled to hold property independently
and separately. 19 Second, there is an uncertainty as to the language
necessary to create the estate. The presumption that a conveyance to
husband and wife created a tenancy by the entirety no longer exists.
It has been modified by statutes and by court decisions. 20  Third, the
estate is commercially undesirable. It serves to frustrate the creditors of
the spouses and allows one spouse to use the other as a means of avoiding
commercial obligations. 21
These arguments warrant consideration, but they should not be
blindly accepted. Worthy arguments on the other side can be found.
First, while the husband's right of control over the property of the wife
no longer.exists, the wife should be entitled to the use and enjoyment of
the whole estate owned jointly by her and her husband during their joint
lives. This is true despite the destruction of the common law concept of
husband and wife as one legal person.22 Second, regardless of the un-
certainty of creating the estate, careful drafting combined with detailed
consideration by the courts would effectively counter it. Third, creditors
only have the rights given to them by the law. The law provides for the
recording of all real property conveyances to give notice of the holder's
interest to prospective creditors and buyers. The law does not give
creditors the right to take the property of the wife for the debts of her
husband.
23
In the instant case, the Montana Supreme Court stated that the ten-
ancy by the entirety was not a permissible mode of ownership in Montana.
In making this bold flat statement, the court left unanswered important
questions. First, did the court mean that tenancy by the entirety as
it existed at the common law was not a recognizable form of co-owner-
ship in Montana? This proposition is doubtful. If the court had taken
the suggested position, it would still have had to construe the language
of the instrument under consideration to determine whether the modern
could have been created was the joint tenancy. Dictum is often defined as answering
a question or making a determination not actually before the court. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). The determination by the court in the instant case fits
this definition.
19Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895); Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo.
461, 163 Pac. 76 (1917); Douds v. Fresen, 392 Ill. 477, 64 N.E.2d 729 (1946).
"Collins v. Morris, 314 Mich. 145, 22 N.W.2d 249 (1946). In Montana, a joint interest
must be expressly declared. In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 239, 234 P.2d 459
(1951); R.C.M. 1947, § 67-313.
urarrell v. Paulis, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N.W.2d 700 (1944).
2".. . The right of the wife to the joint enjoyment of the estate, during the mar-
riage, is as valuable and sacred as the right of taking the entire estate by survivorship
upon the death of her husband . . . . There is an equity in equality, but there is
a gross inequity and injustice in permitting the husband to deprive the wife of the
use and enjoyment of an estate that does not belong to either, but to both, and which
belongs as much to the wife as to the husband." Ward Terry &" Co. v. Hensen,
supra note 11, quoting from an early Indiana case, Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391,
408-409 (1871).
2Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, supra note 11. R.C.M. 1947, § 36-109.
[Vol. 25,
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form of the estate had been created. The court did not so approach the
question.
Second, assuming that no form of the tenancy by the entirety is
recognized by Montana law, what is to happen to a conveyance which
attempts to create such? The answer to this question was not considered
by the Montana court. Three possibilities exist.
The court, refusing to recognize the estate, may hold that an attempt
to create it would be void. To accept such a proposition would create con-
fusion and would impose an undue hardship upon transferees and trans-
ferors. Many persons relying upon a deed containing language creating
the estate would find themselves claiming title based on a void con-
veyance.
An attempt to create the estate could result in a joint tenancy. This
proposition is probably but not desirable. It is probable because of the
similarity between the tenancy by the entirety and the joint tenancy and
because of language in various Montana decisions.2 4 The proposition is
undesirable because the right of survivorship in a joint tenancy is de-
structible by the unilateral action of one tenant. To construe an attempt
to create a tenancy by the entirety as producing a joint tenancy would
allow the husband to destroy the wife's right of survivorship. To do so
would deprive the wife of the primary incident of the tenancy by the
entirety as it existed at the common law, the right to the use and enjoy-
ment of the whole. It is submitted that this was not the purpose of the
Married Women's Act.
The position taken in New Jersey could be adopted. If accepted,
the right of survivorship would be retained as indestructible, yet either
party could convey his or her interests during the joint lives of the
spouses. This is a desirable proposition although such is founded upon
fallacious reasoning; namely, that the purpose of the Married Women's
Act was to deprive the wife of the use and enjoyment of the whole of the
estate during the life of her husband.25
The tenancy in common with the right of survivorship is a form of
co-ownership unknown to the common law. However, such an estate is
possible in Montana due to the Montana Supreme Court's construction of
three statutes, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 67-308, 67-310 and 67-312. In considering
section 67-310, the court said, "[t] he legal effect of this enactment was
to provide that the right of survivorship exists in those classes of con-
veyances covered by it, whether made to joint tenants or to tenants in
estate of entirety, but does not purport to exclude the right of survivor-
ship in other types of conveyances. '26 In considering section 67-308, the
-R.C.M. 1947, § 67-310, provides: "In all conveyances of real property made in
joint tenancy or to tenants in estates by entirety, where the right of survivorship is
contained in the grant of such conveyance, the right of survivorship is hereby ex-
pressly declared to exist by virtue of such grant.'' In the instant case at 910, the
court stated that the right of survivorship is recognized when such a right is contained
in a conveyance creating either the estate by the entireties or the joint tenancy.
Thus, it is highly probable that an attempt to create an estate by entireties would
result in a joint tenancy. See also Hennigh v. Hennigh, supra note 16.
25See supra notes 7 & 22.
"Hennigh v. Hennigh, supra note 16 at 1024. See also the instant case at 910.
1964]
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court stated that the right of survivorship was not limited to the estate
of joint tenancy,2 7 and in considering section 67-312, the court stated
that a tenancy in common was created by a conveyance to two or more
persons which conveyance did not expressly state that the interest
created was other than a tenancy in comminon.
28
It is submitted that the Montana Supreme Court must define its
position on the right of the spouses to the use and enjoyment of the whole
of property conveyed to both of them, on the complexity of creating the
estate by the entirety, and on the rights of creditors. Until the court so
defines its position, the question as to what type of estate is created by
language which ordinarily would create the tenancy by the entirety will
remain unanswered and lawyers and clients will be forced into litigation
to determine their rights.
FRED RATHERT.
FEDERAL COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IF THE STATE COURT HAS DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT. -The defendant was convicted of burglary and sentenced to
twenty years imprisonment. No appeal was taken within the statutory
period. Applications were made to the Montana Supreme Court for writs
of certiorari and habeas corpus. Each application alleged that evidence
used against the defendant was obtained by illegal search and seizure,
and that he was not represented by competent counsel. All applications
were denied. The defendant than applied to the federal district court for
a writ of habeas corpus. That court, finding the allegations to be true,
held: granted. Petitioner's conviction and present confinement are il-
legal and in violation of his rights under the Fourth, Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and that
the conviction should be put aside and he should be released from con-
finement.' Application of Tomich, 221 F. Supp. 500 (Dist. Ct. Mont. 1963).
Long before an established system of law was brought to the United
States, habeas corpus was considered "[T]he most celebrated writ
in the English law."'2 Although it was permanently secured for the
American people by the Constitution, 3 its use is largely governed by
statute. In 1789, Congress specifically stated that all federal courts, and
judges thereen should have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus.4
52Instant case at 910.
2Ivins v. Hardy, 120 Mont. 35, 179 P.2d 745 (1947). In consideration of this prob-
lem, it is necessary to note also, R.C.M. 1947, § 67-313, and the Montana cases of
Shaw v. Show, supra note 16, and Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251
(1948).
'Because the First Ten Amendments as a whole do not apply to the states, it is
believed the court here meant that the accused had been deprived of rights under
the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth.
23 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 129, as cited in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963).
3,,The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the Public Safety may require it." U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 9.
'1 Stat. 81-2 (1789).
[Vol. 25,
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